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THE HOBBY LOBBY MOMENT
Paul Horwitz*
American religious liberty is in a state of flux and uncertainty The
controversy surrounding Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 is both
a cause and a symptom of this condition. It suggests a state of deep
contestation around one of the key markers of the church-state settle-
ment 2: the accommodation of religion.
The problem is social and political, not judicial, although judges
are obviously influenced by those larger forces. Courts are rarely at
the forefront of significant social change.3  Judges are constrained by
their function: to decide specific cases, based primarily on a finite (if
malleable) set of materials such as prior precedents and statutes.
4
Hobby Lobby itself turned not on the vagaries of the Religion Clauses,
but on the directions laid down by Congress in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of i9935 (RFRA). The Court is routinely criticized for
the incoherence of its Religion Clause jurisprudence. 6 Inevitably, there
are doctrinal disagreements among judges on these issues. On the
whole, however, the judicial treatment of the American church-state
settlement has been relatively stable.
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to my re-
search assistants, Jared Searls and Anna Critz, for their excellent work, and to the University of
Alabama School of Law for its generous support. Drafts of this paper were presented at the Fifth
Annual Law and Religion Roundtable at the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis,
and at Columbia Law School. I thank the participants on those occasions for their questions and
Vince Blasi, Richard Brooks, Alan Brownstein, Ron Colombo, Marc DeGirolami, Abe Delnore,
Deborah Dinner, Michael Dorf, Chad Flanders, Katherine Franke, Rick Garnett, Fred Gedicks,
Kent Greenawalt, Jamal Greene, Philip Hamburger, Bernard Harcourt, John Inazu, Ron
Krotoszynski, Doug Laycock, Kara Loewentheil, Christopher Lund, Bill Marshall, Gillian Metz-
ger, James Oleske, Micah Schwartzman, Elizabeth Sepper, Steven D. Smith, Nelson Tebbe, Mark
Tushnet, and Robin Fretwell Wilson for comments.
1 '34 S. Ct. 2751 (2Q14).
2 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, ro6 NW. U. L. REV. 973, 981
(2012) (discussing the "Western church-state settlement").
3 Professor Michael Klarman puts the point more strongly, arguing that "courts are never at
the vanguard of social reform." Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges:
An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 251, 290 (2009)
(emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 78
(2013) (noting that "courts are supposed to make their decisions on the basis of the law, not the full range
of reasons that any human being might have for acting," and specifying the legal sources they rely on in
constitutional cases). As Hobby Lobby illustrates, statutes are another key decisional resource.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2ooobb-2ooobb-4 (2or2), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (r997).
6 See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION, at xii-xiii (2o 01) (collecting examples).
THE SUPREME COURT- COMMENTS
Conditions are much more fraught outside the courts. In public
discussion and in the scholarly community, the very notion of religious
liberty - its terms and its value - has become an increasingly con-
tested subject.7 In the space of a few short years, the basic terms of
the American church-state settlement have gone, in Professor Law-
rence Lessig's useful terms, from being "taken for granted" to being
"up for grabs."8 Once a fairly "uncontested" issue that remained in the
"background of public attention," religious accommodation has become
a "contested" issue occupying the forefront of public debate. 9 The
change has been sudden, remarkable, and unsettling. The Court's de-
cision in Hobby Lobby will influence the debate outside the courts.
But the decision will not resolve that debate. If anything, it seems
more likely to heighten and prolong the public tension than to calm it.
Unsurprisingly, given the polarized nature of the larger debate over
religious accommodation, most discussions of Hobby Lobby and the
contraception mandate have been equally polarized. On one side of
7 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ii, 140-41, 168-69 (2014); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 407 (2011). For prominent examples of recent work
questioning whether religion deserves special treatment, albeit more as a matter of theory than of
doctrine, see BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); and Micah Schwartzman,
What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2Q12).
8 Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional
Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997) (distinguishing between "taken for granted"
propositions, which can be asserted with little or nothing by way of argument, and "up for grabs"
propositions, which are sufficiently contested to require a more active defense).
9 Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 11o: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory,
II0 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1803 (1997); see also id. at 1803-04. In a useful typology that I draw on
substantially in this Comment, Lessig describes social contestation as falling within a spectrum
along two axes. An issue can be contested or uncontested: subject to "actual and substantial disa-
greement" or to little disagreement at all. Id. at 1802. In our culture, abortion is a contested is-
sue; infanticide is not. Contested issues can also lie in the foreground or background of public
debate. A foregrounded issue is a matter of "sustained public attention," id. at 1803, while a
background issue may be subject to disagreement but is "not perceived to have social salience,"
id. at 1804. For a useful chart and discussion, see id. at 1803-07; and Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity
and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1393-1400 (1997). See also JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 179-82 (2011) (discussing how legal arguments may move
from being "off-the-wall" to "on-the-wall"); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A
History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1824-25 (20cr) (linking
Balkin and Lessig's concepts in a discussion of constitutional welfare rights); Jack M. Balkin,
From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC
(June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2or2/o6/from-off
-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/25804 [http://perma.cc
/8EMV-XCVQ] (applying this idea to different current legal struggles, including the legal chal-
lenge to the Affordable Care Act's "individual mandate," see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), and to same-sex marriage litigation). Of course, specific issues
and disputes involving religious freedom have always been in the foreground of public and legal
debate. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW (2010) (describ-
ing key legal contests involving religion over the past 70 years). But those controversies rarely
called religious freedom itself into question.
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the divide, some saw the contraception mandate as "trampling"10 or
"assault[ing]" religious liberty.1 1 On the other side were those who
warned that a win for Hobby Lobby threatened our local and national
civil rights laws, 12 and perhaps the rule of law itself. 13 After the rul-
ing, most of the immediate reaction to the decision was similarly di-
vided. The polarizing nature of the issue, and of the Court's decision,
was both reflected in and encouraged by Justice Ginsburg's stinging
dissent. 14
As always during times of revolutionary (or reactionary) passion,
those who are more concerned with analyzing the conflict than with
participating in it may find themselves squeezed from both directions.
When an issue moves to the foreground of social contestation, one is
expected to choose sides. Nevertheless, some writers have taken an in-
terest in evaluating and sometimes lamenting the current struggle, not
just fighting it.15
10 Edward Whelan, The HHS Contraception Mandate vs. the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2012).
11 Id. at 2189.
12 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommo-
dations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1237-40 (2014); Leslie C. Griffin, If Conestoga Wins, Watch
Out Civil Rights, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RTS. (Mar. 24, 2014) http://hamilton
-griffin.com/if-conestoga-wins-watch-out-civil-rights/ [http://perma.cc/KA7S-WXKH].
13 See generally MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014).
14 See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is possible that Justice Ginsburg
wrote as she did in part to spur a legal response from the political branches, as in her effective
dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which helped encourage
the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). See Lani Guinier, Courting the Peo-
ple: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 127 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437-42 (2013); id. at
439 ("Justice Ginsburg was courting the people." (emphasis omitted)).
15 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 123 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Rob-
in Fretwell Wilson eds., 2oo8); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 839; Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?,
48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007); Laura K. Klein, Note, Rights Clash: How Conflicts Between Gay
Rights and Religious Freedoms Challenge the Legal System, 98 GEO. L.J. 505 (20io). That Pro-
fessor Douglas Laycock, a forceful advocate of the importance of both religious liberty and LGBT
rights, has ended up being caricatured and condemned for his position is strong evidence of the
squeeze that those in the middle may experience from one or both wings of the debate. See, e.g.,
Dahlia Lithwick, Chilling Effect, SLATE (May 28, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2o14/o5/douglas-laycock-gets-smeared-lgbtq-groups-attack
on the university-of-virginia.html [http://perma.cc/Z6DF-VXZK] (describing and criticizing
some activists' efforts to obtain records of communications between Laycock and various groups,
in order to gain "a full, transparent accounting of the resources used by Professor Laycock which
may [have been] going towards halting the progress of the LGBT community and to erode the
reproductive rights of women across the country" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[Vol. 128:154
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This Comment falls into the analytical category. I have my own
views on the merits of Hobby Lobby. 16 But it is the controversy over
the contraception-mandate litigation, not the case itself, that takes cen-
ter stage here.17 I focus less on the doctrinal questions the Court dealt
with or left unanswered, and more on the legal and social factors that
turned a statutory case into the legal and political blockbuster of the
Term.
More specifically, in thinking about the broader social context that
made Hobby Lobby so prominent and the debate over it so inflamed, it
is the moment that matters. We are in the middle of a process of social
contestation on some key questions: between certain issues being taken
for granted in one direction and their being equally taken for granted
in the other direction. It is difficult, if not impossible, to stand outside
such moments. But there is some value in focusing, at a slight remove,
on the fact of the moment itself.
A great deal of recent constitutional scholarship has examined the
relationship between social and legal change, and between social
movements and courts.1 8 The Hobby Lobby case and its ancillary is-
sues offer an excellent opportunity to consider these relationships.
More specifically, this occasion allows us to scrutinize one particular
stage in the life cycle of social and legal change: the moment at which
an issue is at its most contested and foregrounded. It is unsurprising
16 In short, I think the Court was right in Hobby Lobby. I also believe that - at least as long
as the federal government is unwilling or unable to eliminate the problems that result from enlist-
ing private employers in the provision of what ought to be a public good - the Court should ad-
here to the compromise it offered in the case. Whether it will adhere to that compromise, a ques-
tion raised but not answered by the Court's issuance of a stay in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134
S. Ct. 2806 (2014), or whether some governmental response will alter the shape of the compromise
as the Hobby Lobby Court depicted it, is something I do not venture to predict here. Finally, I
would not have been terribly distressed if the plaintiffs had lost in Hobby Lobby, provided that
they had lost at the interest-balancing stage rather than having their claims denied on categorical
grounds.
17 In that sense, this Comment is thus similar to Klarman's analysis of United States v. Wind-
sor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), in these pages last year, which was more concerned with describing the
"dramatic changes in the social and political contexts surrounding" the decision that "rendered
[Windsor] conceivable" than with championing or criticizing its outcome. Michael J. Klarman,
The Supreme Court, 2012 Term - Comment: Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 129 (2Q13).
18 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
'54 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The
Case of Affirmative Action, 1o5 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Ef-
fects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, ioo
MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2Q14); Theodore Ruger, So-
cial Movements Everywhere, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 18 (2oo6), http://www
.pennlawreview.com/online/ 156-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-262 .pdf [http://perma.cc/QG6X
-NZPM]; Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, i i i MICH. L.
REV. 877 (2013) (book review).
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that courts will speak up at these moments, particularly if Congress
has left them little leeway to avoid or postpone the question. In some
ways, however, these critical moments may also be the ones in which
judicial action is likely to be the least fruitful. These are surely fertile
times for activists and advocates. But perhaps there is good reason at
such moments to hear from ironists 9 and tragedians 20 as well.
The heated nature of our current debate over the contraception
mandate and related issues may prove short-lived. It may be a mere
byproduct of the energy expended in a period of dramatic social trans-
formation. The degree of controversy occasioned by Hobby Lobby
would have been unlikely thirty years ago, given the state of social
consensus at that time. It may prove equally unthinkable thirty years
from now. 21 In the meantime, the Hobby Lobby moment gives us a
chance to take stock of the nature and effects of the social contestation
we are experiencing, and of the rapid changes and reversals of view
that have thrown one of the central aspects of the American church-
state settlement into question.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Hobby Lobby decision. In
my view, the decision itself is not the primary source of the controver-
sy. In any event, both the majority and dissenting opinions are thor-
ough and lucid, although like all opinions they leave questions in their
wake. 22 My discussion in this Part is thus quite brief.
19 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 73 (1989) (defining an
"ironist" as someone who "has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she cur-
rently uses," "realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite
nor dissolve these doubts," and "does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others,
that it is in touch with a power not herself"); id. at 75 ("The ironist spends her time worrying
about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong
language game."). For Professor Richard Rorty, who described himself as a liberal ironist, this
sense of ironism does not preclude one from taking a stand on behalf of one's political commit-
ments, contingent though they may be. See id. at 61. My interest here is not in "liberal ironism,"
but in ironism itself, and the capacity it may offer both to interrogate one's own commitments and
to appreciate the commitments of one's adversaries. I thank Professor Micah Schwartzman for
pressing me to clarify this point.
20 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 59, 87 (1988) (contrasting between
"comic" readings of the Constitution as a document that can provide "happy endings" to conten-
tious issues, and "tragic" readings that emphasize the potential that the Constitution will "pre-
sent[] irresolvable conflicts between the realms of law and morality"). See generally MARC 0.
DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 6-ii (2013) (offering a tragic reading
of the Religion Clauses); HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 303-o6 (arguing that moral remainders are
inevitable in attempts to reconcile religion and liberal democracy).
21 Cf MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 206 (2Q13) (noting that
decisions that were highly polarizing at the time may become "iconic" as public opinion coalesces
around a new consensus).
22 One important question I do not discuss here is the potential limits on religious accommoda-
tion imposed by the Establishment Clause. This question became a point of scholarly contention
concerning the Hobby Lobby case. But it does not figure in the majority opinion, and is not essen-
tial to this Comment's analysis of the Hobby Lobby controversy as a moment of social contesta-
[Vol. 128:154
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Part II discusses the legal and social sources of the controversy.
Legally, it discusses a key element of the American church-state con-
sensus as it existed until recently: the accommodation of religion.23
That consensus is aptly summed up by Professor Andrew Koppelman:
Religion is "a good thing, '24 and "[a]ccommodation of religion as such
is permissible. '25 We may debate whether courts or legislatures should
be responsible for it, but it is generally agreed "that someone should
make such accommodations. '26 Until recently, there was widespread
approval for religious accommodation. 27 That consensus found strong
expression in RFRA, which passed just two decades ago with the
overwhelming support of Congress. There have been dissenters from
this consensus. 28 On the whole, however, it enjoyed "taken for grant-
ed" status. In Lessig's terms, disagreement over religious accommoda-
tions was a background issue, not a foreground issue.
29
The past few years have witnessed a significant weakening of this
consensus. Contestation over religious accommodations has moved
rapidly from the background to the foreground. Accommodations by
anyone - courts or legislatures - have been called into question, in-
cluding by those who acknowledge that until recently those accommo-
dations would have been uncontroversial. Whether religion is "a good
thing"- whether it ought to enjoy any kind of unique status,
and whether that status should find meaningful constitutional protec-
tion - has itself come up for grabs.
This legal contestation has been accompanied by - indeed, may be
driven by30 - significant social dissensus. Although Hobby Lobby
tion. For a thorough development of this argument, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.
Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommo-
dation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2o14). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks &
Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the
Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2o14). For responses, see, for example,
Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 39 (2Q14); and Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate
Violate the Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF JUsT. (Dec. 5, 2Q13), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs
.com/mirrorofjustice/2 Q13/I2/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment
-clause.html [http://perma.cc/37B7-MSPJ].
23 In line with common usage in this area, I refer mostly to "religious accommodations" in this
Comment rather than "religious exemptions."
24 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 2.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 See sources cited infra notes 1o5, 118.
29 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30 Cf. Perry Dane, Doctrine and Deep Structure in the Contraception Mandate Debate (July
21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/so13/abstract=2296635 [http://perma.cc/HCZ5
-KQPP] (noting the heated nature of the battle over the contraception mandate and discussing the
larger stakes both sides see in the debate).
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itself involves a controversial social issue - the status of women's re-
productive rights - much of the reason for the shift in views on ac-
commodation involves another contested field in the American culture
wars: the status of gay rights and same-sex marriage. The cause of
marriage equality, which seems to be a fait accompli awaiting final
confirmation from the Court, has come increasingly into conflict with
the views of religious objectors to same-sex marriage.31 Same-sex mar-
riage and its consequences have become a central, foregrounded, so-
cially contested issue. The church-state consensus, drawn into the
gravitational pull of this contest, has been put up for grabs
as a result. Part III offers some thoughts about the lessons and impli-
cations of this debate, both for religious liberty and for the general
culture wars that have featured so heavily in the Hobby Lobby
controversy.
A brief caveat is in order. I offer a particular framework for think-
ing about the Hobby Lobby moment in this Comment. It focuses in
particular on LGBT rights and changes in the marketplace as drivers
of the controversy surrounding the Court's ruling. I believe that those
factors have been major influences on Hobby Lobby as a social and le-
gal moment and have contributed significantly to changes in current
views on religious accommodations. But other possible frameworks,
and other factors, exist. One of those, obviously, is the status of repro-
ductive rights and women's access to contraceptive services. I argue
in this Comment that despite the emphasis on that subject in Hobby
Lobby, and especially in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, other factors were
at work in contributing to the degree of public attention and disa-
greement that accompanied this case. This focus is not intended to
deny or disparage the importance of reproductive rights. It is simply
intended to direct attention to other factors, less apparent on the face
of the opinion, that are nonetheless essential elements of the Hobby
Lobby moment.
I. HOBBYLOBBY AS AN "EASY CASE"
Hobby Lobby involves a clash between two federal laws. The Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 201032 (ACA) requires em-
ployers with fifty or more employees to provide "minimum essential
coverage" in their health insurance plans.3 3 Penalties for failing to do
so are steep: an employer that offers a health care plan but fails to
31 For prescient discussions of the issues raised, see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 15.
32 Pub. L. No. III-148, 124 Stat. Iig (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
33 See 26 U.S.C. § 498oH(a), (c)(2) (2012).
[Vol. 128:154
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comply with the minimum coverage requirements faces a $ioo-per-day
penalty for each affected individual.34 The minimum coverage re-
quirements promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) require coverage for "[a]ll Food and Drug Administra-
tion [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures,
and patient education and counseling.
'35
The initial regulations proposed by HHS offered exemptions for a
narrow set of "religious employers," such as churches and religious or-
ders.36 They excluded a wide range of religious nonprofits, such as re-
ligious universities or hospitals, as well as for-profit businesses. The
narrow reach of the exemptions occasioned pushback from individuals
and groups outside37 and inside 38 the Obama Administration.
Ultimately, the Administration expanded the set of accommoda-
tions. In addition to the exemption for "religious employers," the regu-
lations provided that certain religious nonprofits that certified that
they qualified for the exemption and objected to some or all of the
covered contraceptive services could avoid direct coverage of those
services, which would be provided by the insurer.3 9 For-profit corpo-
rations were ineligible for religious accommodations.
The second statute, RFRA, was passed in response to the Court's
controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith.40 The statute
provides that "Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability," unless the burden is "in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering
34 See 26 U.S.C. § 498oD(a)-(b) (2012); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762-64 (describing
the contraception mandate).
35 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Ser-
vices Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (alterations in original) (quoting
Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Sept. 28, 2Q14)
[http://perma.cc/SQ23-MAT 7]) (internal quotation mark omitted).
36 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.I3i(a) (2Q13).
37 See, e.g., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Comment Letter
Re: Interim Final Rules on Preventive Services (Aug. 31, 2Q11), http://www.usccb.org/about
/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventive-services-201 i-o8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6GGK-B8CK].
38 See, e.g., MARK HALPERIN & JOHN HEILEMANN, DOUBLE DOWN: GAME CHANGE
2012, at 66-69 (2Q13); Byron Tau & Donovan Slack, Biden: We 'Screwed Up' Contraception Man-
date, POLITICO (Mar. I, 2Q12, 4:18 PM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2oI2/03/biden-we
-screwed-up-contraception-debate- 116128.html [http://perma.cc/8B9T-PJCJ].
39 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.I3i(b)-(c). Similar treatment was offered for self-insured religious or-
ganizations. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 39,870, 39,893 (July 2, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 45 C.F.R.). HHS
asserted that insurers would incur little or no additional cost as a result. See id. at 39,877, 39,883.
40 494 U.S. 872 (i9o). For discussion of Smith, see infra pp. 168-70.
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that compelling governmental interest. ' '4 1 The statute's purpose was
described as the restoration of "the compelling interest test" set forth in
two of the Court's prior decisions. 42 When Congress passed the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act4 3 (RLUIPA), howev-
er, it deleted a reference to First Amendment law in the section of
RFRA defining "exercise of religion." RLUIPA replaced that language
with a broad, freestanding definition of "religious exercise" as "any ex-
ercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief. '44 Congress emphasized that this definition should
"be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Con-
stitution. '45 The Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states in
1997.46 But it has affirmed and vigorously followed RFRA as applied
to federal law.
47
The contraception mandate was challenged by a wide range of
plaintiffs. 4 The plaintiffs whose cases were taken up by the Court,
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood Specialties, and Mardel, are all closely
held corporate enterprises. Mardel operates Christian bookstores; the
other businesses sell non-sectarian products but operate according to
religious principles.4 9 They and their principal owners brought suit
challenging the application of the mandate as a matter of both RFRA
and the Free Exercise Clause.
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Alito upheld the RFRA
claim without deciding any free exercise issues. If it is not heretical to
say so of a judgment that has aroused such excitement, the opinion
is clear and straightforward, containing fewer rhetorical flights in
its forty-nine pages than Justice Kennedy managed to squeeze into a
four-page concurrence.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v.
FEC,5 0 the most hotly anticipated question was whether corporations
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-i(a)-(b) (2012).
42 Id. § 2ooobb(b)(I) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
43 Id. at § 200oCC-2000cc5.
44 Id. § 2000cc-5( 7)(A), incorporated by reference in RFRA at 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-2(4).
45 Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
46 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
47 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espfrita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423-24
(2oo6).
48 See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http:II
www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/YH3
-TGYE].
49 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66. For ease of reference, I refer generally to only
Hobby Lobby in this Comment.
50 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that corporations may raise First Amendment claims against
government restriction of political expenditures).
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could assert claims under the Free Exercise Clause. As it happened,
the question the Court decided in Hobby Lobby was more prosaic: Are
some corporations "persons" entitled to raise statutory claims under
RFRA? The answer was yes. The Dictionary Act, which applies here,
defines the word "person" to include corporations. 51 Corporate claims
have been "entertained" under both RFRA and the Free Exercise
Clause. 5 2 RFRA "was designed to provide very broad protection for
religious liberty '53 and should not be read constrictively. Nothing in
the corporate form, which is ultimately a flexible "fiction," demands
that the statute be construed to exclude such claims; the corporations
pay the penalty, but "the humans who own and control those compa-
nies" feel the sting of the religious burden. 54  Whatever questions
might arise in future cases, this one involved "closely held corpora-
tions, each owned and controlled by members of a single family.
55
They were, as Justice Sotomayor noted at oral argument, the perfect
plaintiffs for purposes of this question.
56
The rest of the plaintiffs' case went smoothly. The penalties for
failing to cover the objectionable contraceptive services were sufficient
to constitute a substantial burden. 57 HHS's most viable argument was
that the claim of a substantial burden was too attenuated, given the
distance between the provision of coverage and the individual choices
of employees whether to use particular contraceptive methods. Fol-
lowing its precedent in Thomas v. Review Board,58 however, the Court
declined to second-guess the religious judgment of the plaintiffs, whose
sincerity the government did not question, that the provision of cover-
age entailed wrongful cooperation with a grave moral evil.
59
The burden under RFRA then shifted to the government. Although
the Court noted that RFRA's test for a compelling government interest
requires a particularized inquiry into "the asserted harm of granting
specific exemptions to [the] particular religious claimants" challenging
the mandate, 60 and showed some solicitude for the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that HHS's interest could not be considered compelling given the
51 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (citing Dictionary Act, I U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
52 See id. at 2768-70.
53 Id. at 2767; see also id. at 2772 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2ooocc-3(g)).
54 Id. at 2768.
55 Id. at 2774.
56 See Transcript of Oral Argument at i9, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Nos. 13-354, 13-
356, 2o14 WL 1219115 at *i9, decided sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/13-354-3ebh.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RK7G-LQC 3 ].
57 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
58 450 U.S. 707 (198).
59 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
60 Id. at 2779 (quoting Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espfrita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 431 (2oo6)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20141
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
other exemptions to the mandate, 61 it proceeded on the assumption
that the government had shown a compelling interest.
62
The final question was whether the government had selected the
"least restrictive means" of achieving this interest. 63  Here, the gov-
ernment was hoist by its own petard, having strenuously maintained,
by way of justifying the exemption scheme for nonprofits, that the ex-
emption would fully cover female employees of those entities without
either the insurers or the employees incurring serious additional
costs. 64 Under the circumstances, it was not hard for the majority to
conclude that the nonprofit exemption mechanism could be extended
to objecting closely held for-profit corporations, in a way that neither
"impinge[d] on the plaintiffs' religious belief[s]" nor failed to "serve[]
HHS's stated interests equally well.
65
Writing for a four-member minority, Justice Ginsburg dissented,
blasting the majority for a "decision of startling breadth '66 that was
too accepting of religious exemptions from general laws and too willing
to require the public to bear the costs of those exemptions. 67  The
Court, she charged, wrongly treated RFRA "as a bold initiative de-
parting from, rather than restoring, pre-Smith jurisprudence. '6  Con-
gress had "enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose" than
that.69
On the merits, Justice Ginsburg charged, "the Court falter[ed] at
each step of its analysis."70 The existing caselaw did not support the
extension of the right to engage in religious exercise, which is "charac-
teristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities," to for-profit cor-
porations.7 1 Some "artificial legal entities" should be protected, be-
cause "[r]eligious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons
subscribing to the same religious faith, '7 2 but the line should be drawn
61 See id. at 2780. Justice Kennedy wrote separately to underscore "the importan[ce] [of] con-
firm[ing]" the "premise ... that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and com-
pelling interest in the health of female employees." Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62 See id. at 2780 (majority opinion).
63 Id. at 2781 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-r(b)(2) (2012)).
64 See id. at 2781-82; Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,882 (July 2, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 45 C.F.R.).
65 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782; see also id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing,
with reference to the nonprofit exemption mechanism, that "the record in these cases shows that
there is an existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework to provide cover-
age" to female employees).
66 Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67 See id.
68 Id. at 2791-92.
69 Id. at 2787.
70 Id. at 2793.
71 Id. at 2794. Justices Breyer and Kagan did not join this section of the dissent.
72 Id. at 2795.
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at "for-profit corporations. '"7 3 Nor could the plaintiffs show a substan-
tial burden, because of the attenuation between any religious claims by
the corporate owners and the independent contraceptive choices of
their employees. 4  The government's interests in "public health and
women's well being," she emphasized, were clearly compelling.7  And
what she described as the "let the government pay"7 6 approach of the
majority on the least-restrictive-means test failed to shield female em-
ployees from potential "logistical and administrative obstacles,"7 7 and
would lead to an endless stream of accommodation demands by for-
profit corporations.7"
In the face of an eloquent dissent, much of which commanded four
votes on the Court, it is surely a purposeful exaggeration to call Hobby
Lobby an easy case, as I have done here. Better, perhaps, to call the
Court's decision highly straightforward. Justice Kennedy is right to
pay tribute to Justice Ginsburg's "powerful dissent."7 9 But he is right,
too, to dismiss it as overstated. 0 And he correctly places the credit (or
blame) where it lies: not with Justice Alito's opinion, strong as it is, but
with RFRA, which supplies the propulsion in both Hobby Lobby and
Chief Justice Roberts's equally clear opinion in Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Unidio do Vegetal.1l Both opinions move forward
not under their own steam, but under the compulsion of a powerful




It would be reasonable in these circumstances for those who dislike
the outcome in Hobby Lobby to raise doubts about RFRA itself,
although I do not share those doubts. But at least such a view would
properly place the blame where it lies. It is the statute, not the deci-
sion, that provides Hobby Lobby with its "startling breadth. '8 3 Given
73 Id. at 2796.
74 See id. at 2798-99.
75 Id. at 2799.
76 Id. at 2802.
77 Id. (quoting Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,888 (July 2, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 45 C.F.R.)) (in-
ternal quotation mark omitted).
78 See id. at 2802-03, 2805-06.
79 Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80 Id.
81 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
82 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767; see also id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As the
Court notes, under our precedents, RFRA imposes a 'stringent test."' (quoting id. at 2761 (majori-
ty opinion)); 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 436 ("RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the
compelling interest test, of exceptions to 'rule[s] of general applicability."' (alteration in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb-i(a))).
83 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); cf. Douglas Laycock, The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 254 (noting that RFRA is a consequence
of the Court's earlier decision in Smith: "[r]eligious liberty was committed into the hands of shift-
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that RFRA has been around for twenty years, and was reinforced by
amendment almost fifteen years ago, it is rather late in the day to be
startled. To the extent that RFRA is a "putative super-statute, 8s 4 one
with "quasi-constitutional" status,8 5 it cannot be surprising that it is
powerful medicine.
II. FOREGROUNDED CONTESTATION AROUND HOBBY LOBBY
Hobby Lobby was not, in doctrinal terms, the hardest case of the
Term. Nor, given the possibility of a legislative response, was it
unfixable even if it was wrong. Even for those who worried that a
victory for the plaintiffs might disrupt the provision of women's con-
traceptive care, the case was hardly a disaster.8 6 As with the Court's
decision on the ACA's individual mandate, 7 to which in many respects
the contraception-mandate litigation was a sequel, the Court chastened
the Administration but did not prevent it from substantially achieving
its aims. Nevertheless, Hobby Lobby was indisputably the most prom-
inent decision of the Term - and the most excoriated. How can
we explain this apparent gap between a clearly written, politically re-
visable opinion in the case, and the sheer amount of controversy it
engendered?
The answer lies outside the four corners of both RFRA and the
ACA, and well outside the firm but relatively soft-spoken words of the
opinion in Hobby Lobby itself. The majority - perhaps because it
was the majority - did not depict itself as taking sides in a momen-
tous culture war, 8 although it is hard to read Justice Ginsburg's
ing political majorities precisely to the extent that the Court withdrew judicial protection under
the Constitution").
84 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1230 (20cr);
see also id. at 12 16 (defining a "super-statute" as "a law or series of laws that ... seeks to establish
a new normative or institutional framework for state policy" and that, if it "'stick[s]' in the public
culture," ends up having a "broad effect on the law"). Although I doubt the majority would put it
in these terms, much of the heat of the public and judicial contestation over Hobby Lobby might
be seen as a struggle over whether RFRA is a super-statute.
85 Laycock, supra note 83, at 254.
86 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (concluding that the accommodation for nonprofits, if
extended to for-profit corporations, would ensure that "female employees would continue to re-
ceive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives"); see also,
e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Hobby Lobby Decision Was a Victory for Women's Rights,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 30, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/iI8488/hobby-lobby
-decision-was-victory-womens-rights [http://perma.cc/U72S- 3 K3V].
87 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2Q12).
88 That Justice Alito wrote his opinion for a majority of the Court might have affected the
tone of the opinion for several reasons. The opinion might have been written to avoid directly
engaging culture-war issues in order to secure votes. It might have been written in this manner to
deflect attention away from hotly contested issues, which a dissent might naturally want to em-
phasize. Or it might simply reflect the general rhetorical approach of majority opinions, which
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dissent in any other way. Just the same, the case's status as both a
product of and a contributor to the larger culture war is unmistakable.
To understand the furor over Hobby Lobby, it is necessary to turn
away from the opinion itself and examine the particular moment of
foregrounded legal and cultural contestation it represents.
A. Legal Contestation: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Accommodation of religion is an aboriginal feature of American
public law. From the earliest days of the Republic, exemptions from
legally imposed burdens on religious belief and practice "were seen as
a natural and legitimate response to the tension between law and reli-
gious convictions."' 9  Although the principle was not universally
agreed upon - Thomas Jefferson famously insisted in his letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association that "[man] has no natural right in oppo-
sition to his social duties" 90 - accommodations were widely granted
by both Congress and the states to religious groups or individuals con-
fronted with laws that burdened their religious obligations. Some of
those accommodations, with exemptions from military service being
perhaps the most prominent example, necessarily entailed the shifting
of costs onto third parties. 9 1 There have been arguments over whether
that history suggests that the Free Exercise Clause requires a judicially
enforceable right to religious exemptions, 92 or whether it means only
that accommodations may be granted by legislatures or state constitu-
tions. 9 3 But neither position denies that some branch of government
could opt to accommodate religious objectors to general laws.
For close to thirty years, the Court's view was that religious exemp-
tions - even from neutral, generally applicable laws - were more
than permissible: they were mandatory and judicially enforceable.
The case that announced this rule, Sherbert v. Verner,94 involved a
non-neutral law: the unemployment compensation law in question sin-
gled out Sunday worshippers for accommodation and thus discrimi-
tend to adopt an official rather than a personal voice and to impart an air of inevitability and ob-
viousness, whether warranted or not, to the prevailing view.
89 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1466 (iggo).
90 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. I, 1802),
in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
91 See McConnell, supra note 89, at 1468-69 (offering examples and noting that religious ex-
emptions from military service imposed "high costs" on those who were required to serve, id. at
1468).
92 See, e.g., id. at 1511-13.
93 See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 6o GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916-i 7, 929-30 (1992).
94 374 U.S. 398 (I963).
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nated among religious beliefs. 95  Later cases, however, made clear that
an exemption would be required unless the countervailing government
interest was "of the highest order and ... not otherwise served, '96 even
where the regulation in question was indisputably neutral. 97 The rule
may have been weakly or inconsistently applied, 9 but there was little
doubt that it was the rule. 99
All this changed with Employment Division v. Smith. There, the
Court held that "an individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate." 100 The Free Exercise Clause would no
longer be read to "relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion pre-
scribes (or proscribes)."' 10 1 But Smith made clear that whatever the
fate of judicially ordered exemptions, political actors remained free to
create "nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s]" from gener-
ally applicable laws. 
10 2
Given the shift in views on accommodation of religion that has ac-
companied the contraception-mandate controversy, it is worth re-
calling just how harshly Smith was viewed at the time, by political
liberals and progressives as well as religious conservatives. Writing in
these pages soon after the Court's decision, Professor Robin West de-
scribed Smith as "perhaps the most politically illiberal decision of the
95 See id. at 4o6. Note, however, that the Court did not treat the equality argument as neces-
sary to its conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to an exemption. See id. ("The unconstitu-
tionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the religious discrimina-
tion which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily effects." (emphasis added)).
96 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
97 See id. at 220 (requiring an exemption for children of objecting Amish parents from a man-
datory school attendance law).
98 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 42-45 (2oo7); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging.
The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 300 (1992); cf. James E.
Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78
VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412, 1416-17 (1992) (noting the low success rate in the lower courts, in the
decade leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, of religious exemption claims under
the compelling interest test).
99 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. iio9, 1109-10, 1120-21 (1990).
100 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 878-79. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice An-
tonin Scalia, distinguished or cabined the earlier cases but did not overrule them. Few people,
however, including Smith's defenders, credited this effort. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble
with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 n.5o (1992) (calling the distinctions from
prior cases offered in Smith "so sophistic as to suggest that Justice Antonin Scalia relied upon
them only for the purpose of maintaining his majority").
101 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment)).
102 Id. at 89o.
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term.'' 10 3 The majority, she wrote, had "reversed long-settled liberal
principles of free exercise jurisprudence that explicitly balanced the
impact on the individual's liberty against the state's interest. ' '10 4 The
general view 1 5 was that Smith had "drastically diminished," 10 6 even
"gutted,"107 "the protections of the Free Exercise Clause."108
This consensus helped fuel the religiously and politically diverse
coalition that midwifed RFRA. 10 9 Both the critical academic reaction
to Smith and the swift legislative response were emblematic of a wide-
ly held view: religious accommodations and exemptions are a good
thing. Smith was wrong to eliminate them as a matter of judicially
enforceable constitutional right. But we can, and should, at least take
the opinion at its word and be "solicitous" of religious liberty through
the legislature.11 0 Koppelman has nicely summed up that consensus
on religious accommodation:
There is considerable dispute about whether the decision when to ac-
commodate ought to be one for legislatures or courts, but that debate rests
on the assumption, common to both sides, that someone should make such
accommodations. The sentiment in favor of accommodation is nearly
unanimous in the United States.11 1
103 Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43, 53 (i99o).
104 Id. at 54.
105 This position was not unanimous. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Ex-
emptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (iggi); William P. Marshall,
In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (iggi) (criticizing
Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith but defending the rejection of judicially enforceable religious
accommodations).
106 Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Gov-
ernment, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 503 (1992).
107 Id. at 524.
108 Id. at 503; accord Norman Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice William Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L.
REV. 15, i9 (iggo) (describing Smith as having "weakened the free exercise clause"); Frank
Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1355
(iggo) (doubting that "most civil libertarian constitutionalists" would support the narrow reading
of Yoder offered in Smith); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195, 216 (1992) (describing Smith as problematically "majoritarian[]" and calling it as part of
a "retreat on free exercise").
109 See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210-ii & nn.9-io (1994).
110 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (i99o).
111 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 5; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE 120 (2008) ("[O]ver time Congress and the Court have ironed out their differences
to at least some extent, converging on a regime that protects at least some judicial accommoda-
tions and allows others to be introduced legislatively, at both the federal and the state level. This
part of our tradition, at least right now, is in a reasonably healthy state."); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby
Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (forth-
coming 2015) (manuscript at i), http://ssrn.com/abstract=246657I [http://perma.cc/DUS4-U99Y]
("Almost no one thinks that American law would be truly and adequately respectful of religious
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Much has changed since Smith was decided. Indeed, much has
changed even in the short time since Koppelman wrote those words.
In particular, recent years have witnessed the ascendance of a strong
form of legal egalitarianism.112 For people holding that view, claims
for judicially enforceable exemptions from general laws may be seen as
little more than "a special interest demand.
1 13
From this egalitarian perspective, Smith does not go far enough.
The consensus in favor of accommodation of religion that Koppelman
describes seems to have weakened, if not collapsed. A substantial
body of opinion on this issue has moved from the view that Smith
erred grievously by rejecting the prior regime of free exercise exemp-
tions from generally applicable law, to the view that legislative exemp-
tions are permitted but subject to careful cabining, 114 to a broader
questioning of religious accommodations altogether.
We may put the point more precisely. Arguments for religious ac-
commodation have hardly vanished. Hobby Lobby itself is proof of
that, and the principle still has scholarly advocates.1 1 5  What has
changed is that accommodation has become highly contestable - and
the question of accommodation has moved from the background to the
foreground of contestation on church-state issues. In a way that it was
not until very recently, the question of religious accommodation is in
play.
One example of this shift is especially relevant to the Hobby Lobby
moment. Last spring, with Hobby Lobby already teed up in the Su-
preme Court, the Mississippi legislature considered whether to pass its
own Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Given the timing and some
of the bill's content, objections to its passage were to be expected. One
group of law professors, all of them prominent in church-state scholar-
ship, wrote urging the legislature to reject the bill. 116 In addition to
freedom if the law offered no avenue to accommodate deeply held, conscientious religious com-
mitments.").
112 Professor Steven Smith calls this movement "secular egalitarianism." Steven D. Smith, Re-
ligious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now than It
Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033, 2046 (2Q11). That label may be accurate if it is taken to
refer specifically to the position that "legal decisions," broadly understood, "should be based on
secular grounds," and that equality is a "virtually unquestioned" secular value. Id. But not all
stringent egalitarians are nonreligious, and I fear that the label risks misleading casual readers.
113 Laycock, supra note 7, at 422; see also, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 13, at I-3, 8-9, 349-51.
114 Various versions of this position are canvassed in Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemp-
tion Debate, ii RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 157-63 (2009).
115 See, e.g., Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions - Whether Religion Is Spe-
cial or Not, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1395 (2o14) (book review); see also HORWITZ, supra note 6, at
I91-92.
116 See Letter from Ira C. Lupu, Professor of Law Emeritus, George Wash. Univ., et al.,
to Phillip Gunn, Speaker, Miss. House of Representatives, et al. (Mar. 1o, 2014), http://content
.thirdway.org/publications/7 95/Letter-by-Religious-Liberty-Scholars-Opposing-Mississippi-B ill
-268i.pdf [http://perma.cc/6MAN-KWYE] [hereinafter Mississippi RFRA Letter].
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making specific criticisms of the bill, they added this candid - and
telling- peroration:
Twenty years ago, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act might have
been less fraught with legal and policy peril. Now, when it will most like-
ly be both seen and used as a shield against enforcement of civil rights
laws (current and future), enacting it seems like a uniquely poor idea. Do-
ing so will harm the state's reputation as well as its legal culture.
1 1 7
It is not striking that the Mississippi bill should have drawn oppo-
sition. Beyond any doubts about the merits of the specific provisions
of the bill in question, some of the letter's signers had already voiced
more general reservations about legislative accommodations of reli-
gion.11S What is striking is the particular argument employed here.
RFRA's one-time legitimacy is conceded, if grudgingly. Today, howev-
er, the signatories argue that such statutes are more problematic - not
because of their particulars alone, but because of how they will be
4seen.'119
One hesitates to build an argument on a turn of phrase. In this
case, however, the language is important. It captures the movement of
the religious accommodations question from the background to the
foreground of contestation in our legal and political culture, and ges-
tures at some of the reasons for this change. Even at the height of
support for RFRA and other legislative accommodations for religion,
after all, it was hardly unforeseeable that these laws might conflict
with nondiscrimination statutes. 120 At the time, however, those con-
cerns had to be balanced against what was then seen as the positive
value of religious accommodation itself.
The balance of concerns has now shifted significantly. As I argue
below, many of the reasons for that shift are obvious. Less visible,
however, is the fact that, in the process, an increasing number of peo-
ple have come to see religious accommodation not just as losing in the
117 Id. at 6.
118 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (iggg); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (iggi); Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 6o GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Schwartzman, supra note
7. Other signers have at least treated the constitutionality of legislative accommodations as a giv-
en in the past. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1292-96
(2008).
119 Mississippi RFRA Letter, supra note 116, at 6 (emphasis added); cf. Paul Horwitz, "A Trou-
blesome Right": The "Law" in Dworkin's Treatment of Law and Religion, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1225,
1238 & n.ioo (2014) (suggesting that for those who believe that law should express the values of
nondisparagement or equal dignity, the very existence of some religious accommodations or ex-
emptions may increasingly be seen as harmful in and of itself).
120 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 208-I0 (I995).
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balance against other interests,121 but as not presenting much of an in-
terest at all. For some, religious accommodation has become virtually
synonymous with, or code for, discrimination. 122 It is not so much los-
ing in the balance as dropping out of the equation altogether.
Although the phrase is perhaps not meant to suggest this much, the
letter's authors are at least strategically smart to suggest that religious
accommodation statutes are now viewed very differently by the legal
and political culture. The ground has shifted from underneath these
statutes.
B. Social Contestation
Shifts in contestation on legal meanings do not occur in a vacuum.
They are driven by social contestation: by what positions are treated
as contestable or uncontestable, utterable or unutterable. Here, too,
there have been significant changes. The contraception-mandate liti-
gation, and the public response to the decision in Hobby Lobby, may
shed further light on these changes.
i. LGBT Rights. - Hobby Lobby involved the use of contracep-
tives, whose acceptability is "as close to cultural consensus as we
get.'123  Much of the early critical reaction to Hobby Lobby under-
standably focused on women's access to contraceptive services, which
is indeed an important public health issue. 124 For a variety of reasons,
some sincere and some strategic, most of the public criticism and polit-
ical vote-whipping in response to Hobby Lobby has focused on wom-
en's healthcare and equality.125  But this issue was not the sole cause
of the pre- and post-decision controversy surrounding Hobby Lobby.
121 See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 15 (arguing that conflicts between religious liberty claims
and nondiscrimination claims should generally be decided against the religious claimants,
but insisting that the burdens on religious individuals and institutions in those cases are real and
substantial).
122 See, e.g., JAY MICHAELSON, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCS., REDEFINING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS (2013), http://www.politicalresearch
.org/resources/reports/full-reports/redefining-religious-liberty [http://perma.cc/CRF3-JYVT].
123 Ross Douthat, Sex and Consequences, N.Y. TIMES: EVALUATIONS, July 8, 2Q14,
http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2or4/o7/o8/sex-and-consequences/ [http://perma.cc/7VRN-R 4 8L];
see also, e.g., Frank Newport, Americans, Including Catholics, Say Birth Control Is Morally OK,
GALLUP (May 22, 2Q12), http://www.gallup.com/poll/r54799/americans-including-catholics-say
-birth-control-morally.aspx [http://perma.cc/WW5F-CNF8].
124 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 303, 336 (2Q14). Justice Kennedy wrote separately in Hobby Lobby
to emphasize this point. See '34 S. Ct. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Decision: Republican Senate Candidates Would Go Further than
SCOTUS, Support Radical Measures to Block Birth Control, DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE (June 30, 2Q14), http://www.dscc.org/pressrelease/hobby-lobby
-decision-republican-senate-candidates-would-go-further-scotus-support [http://perma.cc/XWL2
-YSE 2]. By contrast, while much of the post-decision discussion involved reproductive rights,
most of the pre-decision discussion involved LGBT issues.
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The Court's decision, after all, was premised on the assurance that
women's access to reproductive services would be secure, regardless of
employer.126 The majority may have glossed over the practical diffi-
culties involved in making this assurance a reality, but the fact remains
that the plaintiffs won only because both the government and the ma-
jority made clear that women's access to reproductive services would
be unimpaired. To be sure, the decision would still have been contro-
versial had its only subject been women's health. But more was need-
ed to make it explosive.
The "more," it seems clear, is LGBT rights, specifically same-sex
marriage and ancillary issues. The change in views on this subject is a
paradigmatic example of the way that social meanings, and ultimately
legal readings, can move from uncontestability at one end of the spec-
trum, through a period in which their meaning is "contested" and "po-
litical,"127 and ultimately to uncontestability at the other end of the
spectrum. Public views on LGBT rights and same-sex marriage have
made much of this journey, in a very short time.12
3
Those views have in turn fed changes in judicial understandings of
the plausible meaning of the Constitution's broad guarantees. Fifty
years ago, "homosexual practices" sat comfortably on the list of seem-
ingly self-evident exclusions from an evolving interpretation of the Due
Process Clause and its protections for conduct within "lawful mar-
riage. ' ' 129  The law has changed dramatically since then. 130  Last
Term's decision in United States v. Windsor1 31 seems likely to lead
soon to final confirmation in the Court that the fundamental right that
126 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 276o ("The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the
women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be
precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be entitled to all FDA-
approved contraceptives without cost sharing.").
127 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395, 417 (1995).
128 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 21, at 130-34, 149-52, 156-57; ROBERT D. PUTNAM &
DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE 402-o6 (2010).
129 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (ig6i) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The] laws forbidding adul-
tery, fornication and homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confin-
ing sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis."); see also Lessig, Fi-
delity and Constraint, supra note 9, at 1427 (noting that in roughly the same time period, the view
that homosexuality was a "disease" was "common ground for liberals as well as conservatives" on
the Court (citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 127 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
130 See generally Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity, 127
HARV. L. REV. 168o (2014) (discussing legal and social changes in this area).
131 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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not long ago "dare[d] not speak its name ''132 emphatically includes the
right to form a family.
133
These myriad changes have not just been a matter of background
contestation, of slow and quiet change. They have occupied the fore-
ground of public political and cultural discussion. 134 And given the
background presence of antidiscrimination laws, which in many states
now cover sexual orientation,135 they raise corollary legal issues con-
cerning the religiously motivated conscientious refusal to provide ser-
vices to gays and lesbians in relation to same-sex marriages.136
Gay rights and same-sex marriage barely featured at all in the texts
of the opinions in Hobby Lobby. They surfaced briefly in Justice
Ginsburg's dissent and its list of potential "minefield" issues raised by
the majority's "immoderate reading of RFRA. ' 137  In noting that
"Hobby Lobby and Conestoga surely do not stand alone as commercial
enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the
basis of their religious beliefs, '1 38 Justice Ginsburg allowed a brief cita-
tion to the notorious Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock 139 case to hint
at these broader questions. 14° The majority was even more circum-
spect. It dismissed the dissent's concerns that "discrimination in hir-
ing, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious
practice to escape legal sanction," with the curt assertion that "[t]he
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and
132 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, I17 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
133 See Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation
(last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/GKF4-XXGQ] (maintaining an updated list of federal
and state court decisions on same-sex marriage).
134 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 21, at I 1-3; PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 128, at
396-4oi.
135 See Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information - Map, AM. Civ.
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information
-map (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/6RLT-ERNC] (showing states that include sexu-
al orientation among the covered classes protected by antidiscrimination laws). The number is
substantial but still covers fewer than half the states.
136 For an early, but prescient, overview of these issues, see SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 15.
137 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 2804.
139 309 P.3 d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2Q14) (upholding, against a challenge
rooted in free speech rather than free exercise, an antidiscrimination suit against a for-profit pho-
tography business whose owners refused, on religious grounds, to photograph a lesbian commit-
ment ceremony), cited in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140 The dissent also cited In re Minnesota ex rel. McClure, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), which
upheld the application of a state employment discrimination law to a group of for-profit health
clubs whose owners insisted for religious reasons that "fornicators and homosexuals," among oth-
ers, were not suitable employees. See id. at 847, cited in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804-05
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve
that critical goal. ' 14 1 Other forms of discrimination, including both
gender and sexual orientation discrimination, and discrimination in
contexts outside employment, such as the provision of services in plac-
es of public accommodation, went unmentioned.
In this case, however, the absence of evidence is not evidence of ab-
sence. Slightly less than a year elapsed between the New Mexico Su-
preme Court's decision in Elane Photography and the decision in Hob-
by Lobby. In that time, Elane Photography and its implications have
figured in both the contraception-mandate debate and related contro-
versies concerning religious accommodations. 14 2 Both Elane Photog-
raphy and Hobby Lobby played a role in the acrimonious state-by-state
debate over proposed religious accommodations laws in 2013 and
2014,143 and in national reactions to those events, such as the furor
over whether Arizona Governor Jan Brewer should veto legislation
that would have allowed business owners with religious objections to
assert a claim under that state's mini-RFRA if sued by private parties
invoking state or local antidiscrimination laws. 144 The two cases were
yoked together by commentators who asked in advance of the Hobby
Lobby oral argument whether a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs would allow "business owners [to] use religion as an excuse
to discriminate against LGBT people" 145 and raised alarms about an
141 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
142 See, e.g., Sarah Lipton-Lubet, Contraceptive Coverage Under the Affordable Care Act: Duel-
ing Narratives and Their Policy Implications, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 343 (2o14);
Louise Melling, Will We Sanction Discrimination?: Can "Heterosexuals Only" Be Among the
Signs of Today?, 6o UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 248 (2Q13); Linda Greenhouse, Early Warning,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2Q14, http://www.nytimes.com/2oI4/04/03/opinion/early-warning.html
[http://perma.cc/JC7Z-ECF5]; Kaimipono D. Wenger, License to Discriminate? Religious Freedom
Discrimination, Elane Photography, and S.B. 1O62, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 2 1, 2Q14) http://
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2 o14/02/license-to-discriminate-religious-freedom
-discrimination-elane-photography-and-s-b- io62.html [http://perma.cc/F6GL-SBNZ].
143 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Same-Sex Marriage & Religious Freedom: A New Round in
the Old Debate Between Liberty & Equality, COMMONWEAL, Apr. ii, 2014, at 8, https://www
.commonwealmagazine.org/same-sex-marriage-religious-freedom [http://perma.cc/L2V7-NJU5];
Laycock, supra note 15, at 871; Lupu, supra note iii, at 8-9.
144 See S.B. io62, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 2014), http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/2r
/bill s/sb io62 p.p df [http://perma.cc/EVM9-PXUT]; Shadee Ashtari, Arizona Senate Passes Bill
Allowing Discrimination on Basis of Religious Freedom, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2Q14,
1:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpOst.cOm/2OI4/02/20/arizona-religious-freedom-discrimination-n
_4823334.html [http://perma.cc/6P5U-2 4 TK] (noting that one of the bill's sponsors cited the rul-
ing in Elane Photography in support of the law). The bill was vetoed. See Letter from Janice K.
Brewer, Governor of Ariz., to Andy Biggs, President of the Ariz. Senate (Feb. 26, 2Q14),
http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR-022614-SB io62 VetoLtr.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WVS-K 7 7 B]
(discussing the veto of this bill).
145 Adam Winkler, Will the Supreme Court License Anti-Gay Discrimination?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 24, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/will-the-supreme
-court-li-b5020848.html [http://perma.cc/483M-5YPV]; cf Horwitz, supra note 143, at 8-o.
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era of "Gay Jim Crow."14 6  Conversely, opponents of same-sex mar-
riage painted both cases as twin fronts in a "Silent War on Religious
Liberty. '147 If both wings of the Hobby Lobby Court barely mentioned
the conflict between religious liberty and equality for same-sex couples,
it might have had less to do with prudence or minimalism, and more
to do with the fact that all the epithets had already been used up.
The point, to be clear, is not that a case involving real or perceived
access to contraceptive services is not significant in itself. It is clearly
an important substantive issue; it has been a focus of legislative debate
at the state level in recent years; and it was a prominent subject in na-
tional politics in the last presidential election and the recent midterm
elections. But even on politically controversial healthcare issues such
as abortion, some form of accommodation has been reached. For ex-
ample, abortion continues to be (nominally) legal and available, but it
is not publicly subsidized, and substantial conscience exemptions leave
individual providers free to opt out of performing those procedures. 148
That compromise is contested. 149 But, at least with respect to funding
and the mandatory provision of abortions, it is mostly background
contestation. How to reconcile religious objections and LGBT equali-
ty, by contrast, remains very much in the foreground of current contes-
tation. Obviously, the debate over same-sex marriage and religious
liberty is responsible neither for the contraception mandate nor for the
litigation it produced. But the debate has a great deal to do with just
146 See, e.g., Joshua Holland, It's Not Just AZ - "Gay Jim Crow" Laws Are Popping up Across
the US, MOVERS & COMPANY (Feb. 26, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2oI4/o2/26/its-not-just-az
-gay-jim-crow-laws-are-popping-up-across-the-us/ [http://perma.cc/3EQG-AVTZ]; Kirsten Pow-
ers, Jim Crow Laws for Gays and Lesbians?, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2Q14, 1:17 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2 014/02/I8/gays-lesbians-kansas-bill-religious-freedom-christians
-column/5588643 [http://perma.cc/4DFG-YCXH]; Mark Joseph Stern, Kansas' Anti-Gay Segrega-
tion Bill Is an Abomination, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2Q14, 8:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs
/outward/2or4/o2/I3/kansas-anti-gay-segregation bill is an abomination.html [http://perma.cc
/4 KAB-2DRC].
147 Bobby Jindal, Governor, State of Louisiana, Prepared Remarks: The Silent War on Reli-
gious Liberty (Feb. 13, 2Q14), http://officeofgovernorbobbyjindal.createsendi.com/t/ViewEmail/d
/93 oF6 7FooF 7 5 iD6 3 /oB5AEB 3 6B9o9D85o25 4oEF2 3 F 3 oFEDED [http://perma.cc/KJ7C-RP 4 H].
148 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417,
1463-65 (2012). Professor Elizabeth Sepper argues that "same-sex marriage objections lack the
distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection recognized by law" in contexts such as
the provision of abortion. Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 708 (2Q14). That point is important in considering whether the com-
promises over abortion have any purchase in cases such as Elane Photography or Hobby Lobby.
But it does not contradict, and may actually support, the point made in the text above: that it has
been harder to bridge the gap over religious accommodations with respect to LGBT rights than it
has been to arrive at some form of compromise with respect to abortion.
149 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divi-
sive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 42-45 (2008).
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how large Hobby Lobby loomed in the public conversation - and still
does.
2. Changing Views of the Marketplace. - That Hobby Lobby was,
so to speak, in some measure a gay rights case, and that any case that
intersects with the culture wars is likely to receive an added amount of
attention and controversy, are both fairly well understood. Another
facet of the case, however, has gone relatively unnoticed. It has to do
with the very terrain on which Hobby Lobby was fought: the lived ex-
perience of the commercial marketplace itself.
Two related assumptions about commercial life seem to have had
considerable purchase in the responses to the litigation over the con-
traception mandate itself, and the perplexed or outraged reactions to
the Hobby Lobby decision. The first is the doux commerce assumption.
That assumption, which was advanced by Enlightenment figures such
as Montesquieu 150 and revived as a subject by Albert Hirschman,
151
suggests that commerce "is a sociable institution and can be expected
to cultivate virtues"152 conducive to life in a diverse society. Com-
merce "foster[s] tolerance and understanding" and "smooth[s] over so-
cial, religious, and cultural differences. '153 Forced to work and trade
together in the pursuit of goods and private gain, people will be more
likely to set aside their "private grievances"154 and observe "rules, un-
derstandings, and standards of behavior enforced by reciprocity of ad-
vantage. '155 Easily romanticized, 156 often honored in the breach,
157 it
nevertheless retains a hold on our conception of market relations: deal-
ings between employer and employee, between consumers and busi-
nesses, and so on. Those interactions should be thin, broad, and plac-
id. Private attachments and grievances have little or no place here.
The second assumption follows from the first: religion should, for
the most part, be zoned out of the marketplace and market relations.
With only a little hyperbole, Professor Ronald Colombo has called this
150 See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
151 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 59-63 (1977).
152 Henry E. Smith, Rose's Human Nature of Property, Ig WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047,
1048 (2011).
153 Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. I, 17 (2010); see also Cynthia L. Estlund,
Working Together. The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. i, 34-35 (2ooo); Na-
than B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183, 202-04
(2012).
154 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 775 (1986).
155 Id. at 776.
156 See id. (calling the doux commerce concept "perhaps [an] overly roseate Enlightenment view
of commerce").
157 See, e.g., GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999).
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a vision of the "naked private square. '158 The market and its partici-
pants are often viewed "as a thoroughly secular institution in which re-
ligion plays no role and has no place. '15 9 It is an old, now trite obser-
vation that, for many, religion is viewed as belonging mostly to the
"'private' spaces of home and house of worship. '160 This position is
captured in Chief Justice Burger's assertion: "The Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family,
and ... institutions of private choice" such as churches. 161 If support
for this proposition has arguably faded on the Court itself,
162 it is still
very much the prevailing view within the liberal mainstream, includ-
ing those holding mainline religious views. In this division of life into
public and private spheres, the marketplace is assumed to fall more in-
to the public than the private sphere. 163
158 Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HouS. L. REV. 1 (2013).
159 Id. at 6; see also Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, i WM. & MARY Bus. L.
REV. 83, 92 (2010) ("[D]eep-seated patterns of thought, ingrained business practices, and social
norms make it difficult to link the spheres of faith and business, leading to what Alford and
Naughton call 'a divided life,' where matters of Spirit and finance occupy wholly separate
spheres." (quoting HELEN J. ALFORD & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH
MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 12 (20cr)),
quoted in Colombo, supra note 158, at 6 n.2 I).
160 Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Pow-
er, 84 IOWA L. REV. i, io8 (1998). In the I99os, this complaint became prominent with the publi-
cation of Professor Stephen Carter's book, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). President Clinton famously
made a point of praising Carter's book publicly. See Marci A. Hamilton, Review Essay, What
Does "Religion" Mean in the Public Square?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2005) (noting that
Clinton is holding a copy of Carter's book in the portrait of him that hangs at Yale Law School);
Gwen Ifill, Clinton Warns Youths of the Perils of Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1994), http://
www.nytimes.com/i 994/02/04/us/clinton-warns-youths-of-the-perils-of-pregnancy.html
[http://perma.cc/4HWJ-QQGP]. It is no coincidence that it was this period, in which both Demo-
crats and Republicans were seeking to capture the "values" flag and appeal to religious voters,
that saw the overwhelming passage of RFRA. Anyone looking to follow the movement of main-
stream American political thought over the last quarter century should simply track the changing
public positions of the Clintons.
161 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (i97i). That statement was made in the context of
the Establishment Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause. There are good reasons why government
might be disabled from acting in particular ways with respect to religion under the Establishment
Clause, even if it is allowed or required to accommodate religion under the Free Exercise Clause,
although the language of "public" and "private" may not fully capture those reasons. See
HORWITZ, supra note 6, ch. 7. But Chief Justice Burger's statement captures a broader senti-
ment about the role of religion that has been relevant to questions of free exercise and religious
accommodation as well. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note i6o, at 8, 22.
162 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2Q14) (holding that town's practice of
opening board meetings with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause).
163 It is no coincidence that a book on the shopping mall in American law and history links the
modern-day mall to the paradigmatic public space, the agora. See PAUL WILLIAM DAVIES,
AMERICAN AGORA: PRUNEYARD V ROBINS AND THE SHOPPING MALL IN THE UNITED
STATES 49, 58-59 (2001).
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These assumptions about the nature of the marketplace and the
minimal role religion should play within it are woven into American
law itself. With some exceptions,164 the marketplace is often treated as
an identity-neutral, egalitarian space. 165  To the extent that identity
has a place there, it is thin, not thick.
These assumptions play into what was, at least until Hobby Lobby,
the common, mostly undertheorized distinction between nonprofit and
for-profit religious institutions, or between commercial and noncom-
mercial institutions, for freedom of association 166 as well as religious
exercise purposes. 167 Even those who take a robust view of free exer-
cise or associational rights are inclined to respect this distinction, if on-
ly for pragmatic reasons. 168 To fail to respect it falls, for most people
in polite legal circles, into the realm of "unutterability.
' '169
The sacred status of this demarcation was evident in Justice Gins-
burg's dissent in Hobby Lobby, with its concerns about the "havoc"
the Court's (or RFRA's) erasure of the distinction might bring.170 It
164 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-i (2012), upheld in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
165 See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1217 (2000) ("Translating the concept of the undifferentiat-
ed public citizen to the private workplace leads to a view of the workplace as a public, neutral
sphere where differences are irrelevant or emerge only as an expression of private preference.");
Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2o6I, 2063-64, 2072-74 (2003) (discussing
the American desire to "sanitize" the workplace - to "suppress the personal elements of people's
lives that threatened the smooth functioning of the firm," id. at 2073).
166 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6ag, 632-39 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). For some questions about this case, see PAUL
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 2 15-18 (2013).
167 For a thoughtful overview of these questions, see Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Busi-
nesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369 (2Q13). See also Mark
Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 70 (2Q13), http://cornelllawreview.org/clronline/do-for-profit-corporations-have-rights-of
-religious-conscience [http://perma.cc/WFE4-R 4 C6].
168 See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 787, 828-29 (2014).
169 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism's Text, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
12 18, 1220-21 (1998) (describing the process by which ideas become socially "unutterable"). Pro-
fessor Richard Epstein's writing is an arguable exception, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public
Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a
Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1277-78 (2014), but, to be slightly puckish about it, some
of Epstein's interlocutors might question whether his work belongs in polite society, see, e.g.,
Bagenstos, supra note 12.
170 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2794-95 ("The
Court's 'special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,' however, is just that. No such
solicitude is traditional for commercial organizations. Indeed, until today, religious exemptions
had never been extended to any entity operating in 'the commercial, profit-making world."' (cita-
tions omitted) (first quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012), then quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987))). Justice Ginsburg was mostly right about
this, I think. But so was Justice Alito, when he observed that both Justice Ginsburg's dissent and
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featured prominently in public reactions to the litigation, which fas-
tened fiercely on the dangers of extending free exercise claims, statuto-
ry or otherwise, to the commercial realm.17 1 Hobby Lobby's claims,
and those of the other for-profit businesses challenging the contracep-
tion mandate, were seen as an ominous development, accompanied by
citations to the Lochner era.
17 2
In an important sense, however, Hobby Lobby and the litigation
surrounding the contraception mandate simply make evident some-
thing that has drawn too little scholarly notice. In many parts of the
country, this picture of the marketplace as a neutral space, a realm of
thin identities if not actual doux commerce, has been upended by actu-
al practice.
Hobby Lobby itself, with its interweaving of religious views into
business decisions about when to open or close, what to stock, and of
course what benefits to support or oppose, 17 3 is now the most promi-
nent example. But it is not alone. 17 4 Many religious traditions agree
that "[d]ividing the demands of one's faith from one's work in business
is a fundamental error.11 75  To a growing and increasingly visible ex-
tent, a range of faiths and sects take an "integralist" view that sees "re-
ligion not as one isolated aspect of human existence but rather as a
comprehensive system more or less present in all domains of the indi-
vidual's life.117 6  The chains and small businesses that dot the shop-
HHS's argument failed to supply a clear, principled basis for a distinction in this area between
nonprofit and for-profit institutions. See id. at 2769-71 (majority opinion).
171 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Upsets Church-State
Balance and Enhances Digital Privacy in Key End-of Term Decisions (July i, 2014), https://www
.aclu.org/organization-news-and-highlights/supreme-court-upsets-church-state-balance-and
-enhances-digital [http://perma.cc/NS7S- 3 HDS]; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Anti-Discrimination,
NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 25, 2Q14), http://www.newrepublic.comarticle/ii7144/hobby-lobby-ruling
-could-end-anti-discrimination-laws-we-know-them [http://perma.cc/GAT2-22PF].
172 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 1233-34; Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism
(forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/soi3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2463274 [http://perma.cc
/7U 7F-MDQ2].
173 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66 (describing the faith-centered business practices of
Hobby Lobby and the other plaintiffs).
174 See, e.g., Brief of the Cr2 Group, LLC, as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Non-
Governmental Parties at 1-2, 23-3o, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 343191.
175 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, VOCATION OF THE BUSINESS LEAD-
ER: A REFLECTION 6 (3d ed. 2012), http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst
/VocationBusinessLeadlVocationTurksonRemar/VocationBk3rdEdition.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7B6
-4338]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities et al., and
Petitioner Conestoga at 3-9, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 343194. For
other examples, see Colombo, supra note 158, at 3-4, 18-22; Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman,
Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 278-80 (2Q14); and Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Prof-
its: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 66-73 (2Q13).
176 Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and the Workplace: A Social Science Perspective, 30 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 471, 474 (2oo9), quoted in Colombo, supra note 158, at 18; see also Colombo,
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ping areas near the cities and college towns where law schools can be
found may not reflect this development as strongly, but it is happening
just the same.1 77
Not everyone has noticed the extent to which many American
companies or their owners adopt integralist views of religion and busi-
ness. But many have noticed that moral considerations, and not just
profit maximization, have played an increasingly visible and contested
role in the marketplace. As Justice Alito observed, "modern corporate
law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the ex-
pense of everything else, and many do not do so."17 Many for-profit
businesses pursue charitable or social endeavors; 17 9 many investors
and investment funds cater to morally and socially conscious aims;18 0
and many new corporate forms or governing rules recognize the role of
pursuits beyond narrow profit seeking."18
supra note 158, at 16-19 (discussing and providing examples of the increase of religion and spirit-
uality in America in the last two to three decades). See generally ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra
note 159 (providing strategies for integrating faith into business management practices); RONALD
J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION (2014) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library); LAKE LAMBERT III, SPIRITUALITY, INC. (2009) (trac-
ing and analyzing the role of religion in the workplace); DAVID W. MILLER, GOD AT WORK
(2007) (examining the intersection of faith and work and tracing developments in the field).
For a discussion of what has been called the "faith at work" movement and its relationship
to the Hobby Lobby decision, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious
Freedom, THE IMMANENT FRAME (July 8, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/20I4/07/08
/impossibility-of-religious-freedom [http://perma.cc/6V7K-LL 7 4]. Professor Sullivan is more
critical of RFRA than I am, and argues that in understanding the case, "it is important.., to
move beyond the culture-wars framing of most commentaries and examine why it seems obvious,
even natural, to the justices in the majority and to many others outside the Court that Hobby
Lobby is engaged in a protected exercise of religion." Id. Although I agree with her commentary
in many respects, I think the "culture-war framing" is relevant here, in the sense that it is im-
portant to understand how our cultural divides on contested issues have led to a seeming impasse
in this and other cases. It is not required, of course, that those of us who study this area partici-
pate in those battles or frame the issues from one side of the divide or the other.
177 Cf. Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce,
64 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at i, i8-i9), http://papers.ssrn.com/soi3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=240 38 7 7 [http://perma.cc/FN82- 7WTW] (noting the substantial volume of
"commerce between co-religionists who intend their transactions to adhere to religious principles
or pursue religious objectives"). The figures they cite do not appear to include the many business-
es run on religious principles that serve a broader set of consumers, such as Hobby Lobby or
Chick-fil-A.
178 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
179 Id.
180 See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 158, at 22-23; M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Essay,
Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 1o9 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 613-15 (2009).
But see James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1591 ("[M]ore
recently, socially responsible investment has come to look a lot more like ordinary institutional
investment.").
181 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (discussing the rise of "hybrid corporate forms" such as the
benefit corporation); David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1979) (discussing the "corporate social responsibility" movement). See generally Brett
G. Scharffs, Our Fractured Attitude Towards Corporate Conscience (Mar. 12, 2014) (unpublished
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Most businesses still seek to please the largest number of consumers
with the least amount of disturbance.18 2 Accordingly, most corporate
departures from pure profit-seeking will involve relatively uncontro-
versial choices. It did not escape notice in some circles that in the
middle of the Hobby Lobby litigation, President Obama praised CVS
Caremark, the pharmacy chain now known as CVS Health, for its an-
nouncement that it would soon refuse to carry tobacco products.
1i 3
That decision, and the positive response it elicited, might be distin-
guished from the Hobby Lobby case in numerous ways. But the bot-
tom line, so to speak, is that CVS's decision concerned a habit that to-
day finds diminishing public support. It was a safe choice.
Where foregrounded issues of contestation regarding the culture
wars are concerned, we can expect those decisions to be more rare but
also more salient and controversial.18 4 Disputes over LGBT rights and
their relationship to the marketplace offer a timely and pertinent ex-
ample. To take one prominent instance, while the decision in Hobby
Lobby was pending and state-level struggles over religious accommo-
dation were reaching their apex, the CEO of Mozilla, Brendan Eich,
resigned under pressure because of a donation he had made in 2008 to
the Proposition 8 campaign in California.8 5  Following the Hobby
Lobby decision itself, there were widespread calls for a boycott of any





182 This is not always the case, of course. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 167, at 78 (noting the
possibility of niche marketing for religious or other businesses); cf., e.g., Sean P. Sullivan, Empow-
ering Market Regulation of Agricultural Animal Welfare Through Product Labeling, ig ANIMAL
L. 391, 404-05 (2013) (noting a growth in niche markets for "enhanced-welfare animal products").
183 See, e.g., Scharffs, supra note 181, at 1-2.
184 Interestingly, after Windsor, a number of major corporations publicly offered their support
for the Court's decision. See, e.g., Big Brands Come out in Support of Supreme Court DOMA and
Prop 8 Decisions, PINK NEWS (June 27, 2Q13, 12:44 AM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2o13
/06/2 7/big-brands-come-out-in-support-of-supreme-court-doma-and-prop-8-decisions
[http://perma.cc/W7P2-KZC3]. Their willingness to do so may indicate their confidence in public
support for same-sex marriage. It may also be taken, however, as further evidence of the argu-
ment in the text above that the modern marketplace is not devoted solely to profit maximization,
but is also an arena of moral and social contestation.
185 See Taylor Casti, Anti-Gay Marriage Mozilla CEO Resigns After Backlash, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 7, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2oI4/04/03/brendan-eich-anti-gay
-moz n_5o85oo6.html [http://perma.cc/33HN- 9 8K 3 ]. The episode was discussed and critiqued in
a public statement issued by a variety of supporters of same-sex marriage. See Freedom to Mar-
ry, Freedom to Dissent: Why We Must Have Both, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Apr. 22, 2Q14),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/20I4/04/22/freedom to marry-freedom to dissent-why
we must-have-both-122376.html [http://perma.cc/M663-RUQS].
186 See, e.g., Sign the Pledge: Boycott Hobby Lobby, DAILY KOS: CAMPAIGNS, https://www
.dailykos.com/campaigns/75r (last visited Sept. 28, 2Q14) [http://perma.cc/R6LP-YHLH].
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Obviously, distinctions may be drawn between some of these ex-
amples. We may readily distinguish, for instance, between the grant-
ing of government exemptions from generally applicable laws sought
by companies like Hobby Lobby and the exercise of consumer prefer-
ences by supporters or opponents of Hobby Lobby or Brendan Eich.
But it is important to see the bigger picture here. Everyone under-
stands that the questions of women's reproductive health and LGBT
rights that were raised by Hobby Lobby are socially contested. Fewer
observers have noted that the marketplace itself has become a site of
social contestation rather than a refuge from the culture wars.
The reactions to Hobby Lobby - and to the Hobby Lobby chain it-
self, and the existence of numerous religiously observant businesses
that are willing to forego potential customers and disregard some of
the rules of doux commerce - suggest that this change came as a
shock to many. The angry responses the decision provoked - the
calls for boycotts, and the desire to put market forces to work to guar-
antee not just progressive corporate policies, but progressive views by
individual corporate executives - suggest that the marketplace has
become a battleground. Given the issues involved, it is unsurprising
that many stakeholders on both sides of this debate are deeply com-
mitted on these issues, unwilling to set aside their convictions for the
sake of doux commerce, and adamant in refusing to compromise.
Liberals are right to be concerned about this." 7 Justice Alito's as-
surance that "it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to
which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims," 'ss let alone succeed
in them, seems correct to me, for doctrinal and other reasons.1l 9 But if
the marketplace is indeed becoming imbricated with thick religiosity
and with social and political contestation, there is no guarantee that
past performance will predict future results. If the American agora
187 Cf. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2272 (1997) ("[T]he attempt to fix the boundaries between church and
state and the project of liberal theory (of finding an archimedean point to the side of, above, or
below sectarian interest) are one and the same. They stand or fall together, and what would
threaten their fall ... is a religion that does not respect the line between public and private, but
would plant its flag everywhere. An uncompromising religion is a threat to liberalism because
were it to be given full scope, there would be no designated, safe space in which toleration was
the rule.").
188 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
189 On the doctrinal point, as Justice Alito notes, those corporations would face significant
problems showing that their claim was sincere. See id. More broadly, as I noted above, most
companies remain interested in satisfying the greatest number of potential consumers with the
least amount of bad publicity. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text. Worries that a
corporation, or at least one operating outside of a narrower niche, would find it attractive to as-
sert claims for religious exemptions, see, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 167, at 76-82, seem overstated
to me, see HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 227-28 (arguing that even if businesses had wider lati-
tude to argue for a right to discriminate on associational or other grounds, most would resist tak-
ing such a step).
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calms down again, it will not be because Congress or the state legisla-
tures are able to impose some Westphalian peace. Any new peace will
require either a significant settlement of currently contested social
questions or a renegotiation of the norms that govern the marketplace
altogether.
III. Assessing the Hobby Lobby Moment
Hobby Lobby answers some pressing questions, rightly or wrongly,
and wisely keeps silent on others. Notably, it is not Citizens United
redux. Despite the fears that were voiced on this issue during the liti-
gation, the Court did not do for the Free Exercise Clause what Citi-
zens United did for the Speech Clause, although nothing in the majori-
ty's opinion suggests that it would not do so in the proper case. It
does not rely on any claims about the "metaphysical status"190 of cor-
porations, religious or otherwise. 19 1 But neither does it treat the cor-
porate form as a barrier to religious claims; it simply recognizes it as a
convenient "fiction" whose purpose is to serve human affairs.
192  It
reads RFRA firmly and broadly, in keeping with the powerful nature
of the statute. 193 But, despite the possible ramifications of the opinion,
the Court does not extend its holding beyond closely held corporations,
and the opinion makes clear that the compelling-interest calculus will
yield other answers to other questions and other legal regimes, includ-
ing our landmark antidiscrimination laws. 194 It uses the government's
own willingness to accommodate religious nonprofits as a recipe for
further accommodations in the for-profit arena. 195  Indeed, in the end
it appears that the government itself was responsible for Justice Ken-
nedy's crucial fifth vote in favor of the plaintiffs. 196  To be sure, the
opinion left open some tantalizing questions about whether that com-
promise will suffice in all cases. 197 But those questions are hardly in-
capable of resolution. 198 The Court handed Hobby Lobby and similar-
ly situated corporations a significant victory - and made clear that
the government could continue to ensure that female employees had
190 Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About Corporate Rights 2 (Univ.
of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2o13-43, 2o13),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2360309 [http://perma.cc/4PQY-UDQVI.
191 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 2768-75.
194 See id. at 2783.
195 See id. at 2769-72.
196 See id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197 See id. at 2763 n.9, 2782 & nn.39-40 (majority opinion).
198 See, e.g., Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (noting that the govern-
ment may treat direct notification of a religious objection as triggering the insurer's obligation to
provide contraceptive services to employees of the objecting entity).
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full access to contraceptive services. And because the decision was
statutory, not constitutional, Hobby Lobby leaves everything open for
political negotiation and resettlement, however unlikely that looks at
the moment.
Nevertheless, both the litigation over the contraception mandate
and the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby ignited a public
firestorm. A calmly worded and revisable judgment, Hobby Lobby sits
withal in the eye of a hurricane: a perfect storm of foregrounded legal
and social contestation over religious accommodation, LGBT rights,
and a "re-enchanted" 199 and repoliticized marketplace. Its judgment
may channel and constrain the nature of the response to it, but it will
hardly be able to quell the broader contestation over these issues. Ap-
peals to the "culture wars" as an explanation of our national debates
are often exaggerated and sometimes challenged outright.200 But they
are sometimes dead right. If any controversy can be described as a
part of the culture wars, the Hobby Lobby moment surely qualifies.
The primary goal of this Comment is to describe, not prescribe.
Although I share the hope that there remains some room for mutual
accommodation and compromise, I venture no predictions on that
front and offer no reasons for great optimism. Rather, I want to offer
three potentially disquieting assessments of the Hobby Lobby moment
and its meaning.
First, the moment is a significant part of the meaning. There is a
voluminous literature on the relationship between law and social
change. 20 1 Understandably, that work tends to focus on the longer
temporal sweep of social and legal development, to speak in terms of
years and decades rather than particular moments. But the Hobby
Lobby moment is important, and revealing, for being a moment. It of-
fers a window into the difficulty of doing or settling anything at the
precise juncture at which an issue is moving from one end of the spec-
trum of contestation to the other: from religious accommodation being
overwhelmingly popular to its future being cast into doubt, for exam-
ple, or from a constitutional right to same-sex marriage being "unut-
terable"20 2 to its being so inevitable and natural that opposition to it
can be said to lack even a rational basis.20 3 At either end of the spec-
trum, the decisions that courts issue are inevitable. In that precise
199 Johnson, supra note 159, at 97-98.
200 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE
WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 8-9 (3d ed. 2011); ALAN WOLFE, ONE
NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT GOD,
COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE
RIGHT, THE LEFT AND EACH OTHER 88-132 (1998).
201 See sources cited supra note 18.
202 Lessig, supra note 169, at 1220-21.
203 See, e.g., Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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moment of foregrounded contestation, by contrast, they are excruciat-
ing, and unresolvable by ordinary law. Absent the clearest possible
textual support, decisions at the midway point of social change risk
exposing the Court at its most political, for reasons having little or
nothing to do with the Justices' own good or bad faith.
20 4
We may draw a second observation from the Hobby Lobby mo-
ment. Culture wars move at different paces in different places. They
involve different phenomena and institutions with different tempi, in-
fluenced by different factors with different schedules: the pace of gen-
eral and elite opinion, the quick punctuation of elections and the slow
and unpredictable course of judicial vacancies and appointments, the
contest between different groups over who will set the agenda and
which items will come first, the glacial influence of academic debates
and the slow shifts in academic consensus, the tug-of-war between leg-
islative and judicial, and state and federal, leadership on an issue, and
more. We could analogize culture wars, as they play out in law and
politics, to a polyrhythmic piece of music, in which various instru-
ments play longer or shorter patterns over different measures and in
different time signatures. We do not necessarily know at any given
moment in the song what is happening. Nor do we know what will
happen: whether the rhythm and the song will solidify and coalesce, or
decay and fall into cacophony.
We saw much of this phenomenon in the struggle over same-sex
marriage.205 The chorus of post-Windsor judicial opinions and the
movement of public opinion suggest that we may have reached a sta-
ble rhythm. We are not there yet, however, with respect to the issues
that arose in Hobby Lobby and related developments outside the
courts: the status of religious accommodation, its relationship to both
same-sex marriage and sexual-orientation discrimination, the rise of
thick religious commitments in the marketplace, and the fate of RFRA
itself. We do not yet know how, whether, or with what timing this dis-
cordant nation will come together on these issues.
In that sense, Justice Ginsburg may have been both right and
wrong when she protested that the result in Hobby Lobby was not
what Congress had in mind when it enacted RFRA. When it passed
RFRA, Congress was doing many things: responding to the recent de-
cision in Smith, following the New Democratic theme of the 1992 pres-
idential election and seeking to bring religious and values voters back
within the Democratic Party fold, building capital for the 1994 mid-
204 See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2oo4 Term - Foreword: A Political Court, iig
HARV. L. REV. 31, 40-41 (2005). Indeed, as I suggested above, the potential "super-statute" status
of a law such as RFRA may make interpretive decisions about that statute at crucial moments
especially hotly contested, and hence political. See supra note 84.
205 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 2 1.
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terms, and perhaps participating in the longer historical conversation
about the free exercise of religion. It was acting in the moment, not
looking twenty years ahead. If it had, it might well have found the
current state of contestation impossible to imagine. 20 6 Indeed, it only
took a few years for the coalition that built RFRA to splinter over
these very issues. 20 7 But Justice Ginsburg is also wrong, because the
statute, reinforced by RLUIPA, was strong enough to justify - if not
require - the ruling in Hobby Lobby, despite her protestations. Con-
gress was simply acting in a different moment and under a different
rhythm, with a different state of social contestation in mind. Whether
the courts, Congress, and the state legislatures will find some common
ground now is doubtful but not impossible. If they do, however, it will
depend on factors beyond the reach of any one institution, each of
which can move only at its own speed.
20
Both these points lead to a final observation. Precisely because
these pivotal moments are moments of foregrounded contestation and
uncertainty, drawing on the deep divisions that characterize the culture
wars on particular issues, the real battle in these moments, within and
beyond the law, is over what Lessig calls "utterability. ' '20 9 Moving an
issue "on the wall,"2 10 so that it forms a legally plausible argument, is
only the first part of the game. More important still, if one wants to
guarantee or consolidate a victory - particularly one that involves so-
cial as well as legal contestation - is to define what can and cannot
206 See, e.g., id. at 136-37 (noting changes in leading politicians' positions on domestic
partnership, same-sex unions, and finally same-sex marriage). It is striking that Professor Chai
Feldblum, a strong advocate of same-sex marriage, wrote in a book published only six years ago,
in the context of the relationship between same-sex marriage and religious liberty: "In some num-
ber of years (I do not know how many), I believe a majority of jurisdictions in this country will
have modified their laws so that LGBT people will have full equality in our society, including ac-
cess to civil marriage or to civil unions that carry the same legal effect as civil marriage."
Feldblum, supra note 15, at 126. It is unlikely that many people sharing her views would today
view civil unions alone as recognizing the "full equality" of LGBT partners.
207 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 114, at 149.
208 Indeed, that Justice Alito wrote the opinion in Hobby Lobby is emblematic of the ways in
which courts, in particular, move at a very different tempo in the culture wars, often creating dis-
junctions with the larger cultural fabric. Justice Alito built his claim to nomination largely on the
strength of his involvement in the Reagan Administration, but buttressed it with the support of
legal liberals who supported his strong post-Smith reading of the Free Exercise Clause as a Third
Circuit judge in Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, i7o F.3 d 359
(3d Cir. 1999). It is not surprising that he would now author an equally strong opinion in Hobby
Lobby - or that, given the changes in our culture, it should find a much less receptive audience
among legal liberals.
209 Lessig, supra note 169, at 1218-20.
210 See Balkin, supra note o.
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"be said" over the long run, 2 1 1 to define a particular argument as "in-
decent" and thus unutterable.
212
This is an old game. It is at least as old as the once-common sug-
gestion that admission to polite legal circles requires one to avow that
Brown was wholly correct and Lochner terribly wrong. 213 As with
that conventional wisdom, it is always open to recontestation.21 4 But
the goal - especially when the issue is contested, and much more so
when it is both socially and legally contested - is to end the contest,
preemptively if possible, by declaring certain arguments unutterable.
So it is with the arguments in and around Hobby Lobby. The bat-
tle is for the definitional high ground: to define particular religious ac-
commodations, or accommodation in general, as something that will
"harm [a] state's reputation as well as its legal culture";215 to define the
contraception mandate as part of a "war on religious liberty";216 to de-
fine accommodations in the area of same-sex marriage as "Gay Jim
Crow";2 17 or to describe the Court's reading of RFRA in Hobby Lobby
as utterly beyond Congress's imagining and liable to lead to terrible
consequences. 218  Or - as I have described it here - as an "easy" de-
cision that is easy to fix.
These kinds of efforts are understandable, but deeply ironic. They
are most true when they are least needed. No one expends that kind
of rhetorical energy, or succeeds in sparking public interest to this ex-
tent, on an easy case involving an uncontested social issue. Hence the
rhetorical heat of the Hobby Lobby moment. These arguments are in-
evitably pitched in terms of what the law already and incontestably
is - about what RFRA, or prior cases, or the Religion Clauses them-
selves, "clearly" mean. It is not always evident whether those arguing
in such terms believe it. Indeed, it may very well be the mark of a
moment of foregrounded social contestation that the participants in the
argument do believe that what they are saying is clearly and incontro-
vertibly right, even when they should know better.
In any event, the truth is otherwise. The important arguments in
moments of deep social and legal contestation - including the Hobby
Lobby moment - are not arguments about what the law is; they are
211 Lessig, supra note 169, at 1220.
212 Id. at 1220-21 & n.i7 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley,
J., concurring)).
213 See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 59, 90
(1996); Scott M. Noveck, Is Judicial Review Compatible with Democracy?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 401, 427 (2008).
214 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 204, at 53.
215 Mississippi RFRA Letter, supra note ri6, at 6.
216 Jindal, supra note 147.
217 Holland, supra note 146.
218 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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assertions about what our values should be. They are a battle for the
descriptive high ground: for mastery over the terms of utterability.
The heated level of rhetoric in and around Hobby Lobby - seem-
ingly everywhere but in Justice Alito's aggressive but tempered opin-
ion - stands as a recognition of the limits of legal reasoning in such
transitional moments. It is an indirect acknowledgment that the an-
swers to the questions posed by such cases - Is religion special?
Should we accommodate it? Can we make room for both LGBT
rights and religious liberty? How much room is there for pluralism in
the marketplace? - lie outside the scope of any statute or judicial
opinion, Hobby Lobby included. For better or worse, at least in partic-
ular moments of foregrounded legal contestation, everything is uttera-
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